Introduction
In the classic principal-agent theories, such as Jensen and Meckling (1976) , the owner of a firm (principal) designs the compensation contract of the manager (agent) to maximize the value of her firm.
However, most public companies are owned by thousands of shareholders and it can be very costly, if not impossible, for the shareholders to directly write the managerial compensation contract. In most U.S. public companies, shareholders do not even have a say, or vote, in how the executives of their companies are compensated. Instead, shareholders delegate this right to their representatives -the board of directors.
However, many studies find evidence that board design, as well as directors' incentives and actions are imperfectly aligned with shareholders. 1 Further, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) , Bebchuk (2003), and Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2007a, b) , among others, argue that under the current director election system, it is often the managers, instead of the shareholders, who decide the composition of the board of directors. Given this connection, a board may have the incentive to design the compensation contract in the interest of the managers instead of shareholders. Consistent with this conjecture, Core et al. (1999) find that less effective boards are associated with higher CEO compensation and poorer operating and stock performance.
Since passing Sarbanes-Oxley (hereafter SOX), Congress continues to consider additional measures that would give shareholders more influence in the boardroom. These measures usurp powers traditionally residing with managers and the directors. Initiatives relating to shareholder access to the proxy, the procedures by which directors are elected, and the desirability of broker votes have been debated or are still pending in Congress. Few, if any, issues linking management and shareholders are as 1 For example, Yermack (1996) finds that firms with larger boards have lower valuation. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2007) find outside directors appointed by the CEO are less effective in monitoring the CEO. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms with busy boards have lower market-to-book ratios, profitability, and sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. However, Fama (1980) argues that a competitive managerial and director labor market induces the directors to act in the best interest of the shareholders. The Say-on-Pay Bill does not limit executive compensation but requires a non-binding shareholder vote on it. This bill provides a natural experiment to examine whether shareholders' say on executive compensation in particular, and access to the proxy in general, add value to a company.
Arguments can be made supporting and denouncing the legislation. Proponents argue that the bill further aligns owner-manager interests. Opponents worry the bill will restrict the board and management and inhibit their ability to design optimal compensation packages. Since the votes would be non-binding, it could also be argued that the bill would not have any impact in the market. Abnormal returns surrounding advisory proposals sponsored by shareholders, for example, are generally insignificant in the literature.
The objective of this research is to provide an empirical test of whether the Say-on-Pay Bill creates value. We focus on the day the bill passed the House and examine the market reaction to 1,245 of the largest corporations in the United States. Analyzing the impact around this particular day is likely to understate the economic significance of shareholders' say on executive pay. Obviously, passage in the House does not guarantee passage in the Senate let alone approval by the White House and implementation into law. Nevertheless, we find striking results. Stocks of firms with positive abnormal CEO pay react positively to the Say-on-Pay Bill. Further, the positive stock price reaction is more pronounced for firms with relatively weak, but not the weakest governance. These firms are likely to benefit from better compensation design and arguably are likely to implement such improvements under shareholder pressure. Consistent with this conjecture, we find more positive market reaction for a subset of firms that have previously responded to shareholder dissatisfaction expressed in director elections. The firms with the poorest corporate governance may not benefit from the Say-on-Pay Bill since their entrenched managers are likely to ignore the advisory vote by shareholders.
In addition, abnormal returns are higher in the subset of firms most likely to receive higher disapproval votes on such an initiative and more likely to implement changes in response to shareholder votes. These findings suggest that allowing shareholders to have a vote on setting executive compensation may reduce unjustified CEO pay and add firm value, particularly for firms with poor governance and abnormally high executive pay. At the same time, the Say-on-Pay Bill may not benefit all firms. One size does not necessarily fit all in applying the legislation. For example, firms with the lowest level of CEO compensation experience (insignificant) losses around passage of the bill. From a regulatory point of view, our work is important in providing evidence with regard to shareholder access to the proxy and Say on Pay legislation in particular.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we examine the literature relating to the Say on Pay initiative and develop our empirical hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design and contains preliminary descriptive characteristics of our sample. In section 4 we present univariate and multivariate analyses of our hypotheses. Section 5 concludes.
Background and Hypotheses

Background and literature
Shareholder concern about executive pay in not new. The seminal work of Jensen and Murphy (1990) published over 15 years ago was motivated by similar concerns that captured the business headlines prior to that period. Each subsequent year as lists of the highest paid executives are published, the headlines and editorials of the popular press are filled with criticisms objecting to excess. Activism focusing exclusively on executive compensation proposals also finds little impact [Johnson and Shackell (1997) ]. However, Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2007a) find that when members of the compensation committee receive lower votes in director elections abnormal CEO compensation declines.
The Interference Hypothesis
The arguments relating to the Say on Pay initiative can be categorized by three hypotheses: the interference, democracy, and neutral mutation hypotheses. The interference hypothesis argues that the Say on Pay initiative will be disruptive. The reasons for opposing this initiative are articulated by Deane (2007) . Opponents of the bill argue that it will distract the board and management and reduce authority of the board. Moreover, they worry that the initiatives will be divisive or driven by special interests.
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Opponents also worry that companies would not understand the reason for a low vote. The Interference hypothesis suggests: 3 See, for example, Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996) , Black (1998) , Karpoff (2001) and Gillan and Starks (2007) . Barber (2006) is a recent exception. He finds that announcement of the Calpers focus list is associated with significantly positive wealth changes. 4 Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2007b) find that almost all proposals for majority voting are initiated by unions.
The Democracy Hypothesis
The supporting anecdotal evidence in Deane suggests the democracy hypothesis: Say on Pay will improve governance and performance. The Democracy hypothesis suggests a positive reaction to Say on Pay:
The Say on Pay legislation will increase firm value.
The Neutral Mutation Hypothesis
Historically there has been little market impact surrounding the announcement or voting of shareholder proposals. This may be because the votes are symbolic or because management generally does not adopt these proposals even when they receive majority votes. Research documenting the impact of shareholder proposals includes the activism literature previously cited as well as work by Thomas and Martin (1999) and Thomas and Cotter (2007 Apart from the impact of the bill is the question whether it will ever become law. Although it has passed the House, it may never get through the Senate and if it does, President Bush says he will not sign it. Thus, the neutral mutation hypothesis suggests no significant market reaction to the Say on Pay legislation.
H 3 : the Say on Pay legislation will not impact firm value.
Research Design and Descriptive Statistics
To identify the legislative events of the Say-on-Pay Bill, we search the Library of industry classifications, and calendar year dummies as the common independent variables in all three regressions. For the salary and bonus regression, we further include the return on assets as an independent variable since bonus is often linked to accounting performance. For the option compensation regression,
we also include the book-to-market ratio as an independent variable to proxy for growth firms. 6 Both return on assets and book-to-market are included in the total compensation regression. 7 Our compensation regression includes 5,525 firms/year observations, or about 1,842 firms per year. Because of the other data requirements, our 'Say on Pay' sample consists of 1,245 firms. Table 2 reveals that for our Say on
Pay sample, the average abnormal compensation is close to zero.
Since we want to examine how corporate governance explicitly affects the market reaction to the Say on Pay legislation, we do not control for governance characteristics or CEO entrenchment measures in the compensation regressions but examine their impact directly in subsequent tests. Thus, the pay variations due to poor internal control and management entrenchment are captured in our abnormal compensation measure.
In later tests of our hypotheses we will also examine the role of governance and activist holdings.
We note that the average governance index is 9.3, typical of the literature. In an average firm, just over 42% of the outside directors are appointed by the current CEO, and just below one quarter of the outside directors are busy, as defined by holding three or more board seats. The average board consists of nine directors.
The level of votes a proposal receives is obviously an empirical issue. Nevertheless, the level of activist holdings gives some idea of the level of votes known to be supportive of similar issues. We define a mutual fund family as an activist if it votes against the company manager's recommendation more frequently than the median mutual fund family. Since this study focuses on executive compensation and funds may vote differently on compensation and non-compensation proposals, we define activist funds using only the compensation-related proposals. Table 3 presents the univariate analyses of the market reaction to the passage of the Say-on-Pay
Empirical results
Market reaction to Say-on-Pay Bill
Bill. We first sort the firms in our sample into four portfolios by their level of abnormal CEO compensation (using salary and bonus, option compensation, or total compensation as appropriate). Next we use the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model in equation (1) to estimate the abnormal returns to the portfolios during the event window. If the Say-on-Pay Bill is beneficial, firms that would benefit the most (i.e., firms with the highest level of abnormal CEO pay) should experience significantly positive abnormal returns. This is precisely what we find. When pay is measured by abnormal salary plus bonus 8 We find similar results if we define activists using all proposals.
we find that the market reacts positively to firms with most highly paid CEOs (a significantly positive 0.48% over the three-day event window) and negatively to firms with the lowest paid CEOs (a negative 0.06%). A zero-investment portfolio that buys the firms with highest abnormal CEO pay and sells the firms with the lowest abnormal CEO pay earns a risk-adjusted three-day abnormal return of 0.57%, and is statistically significant at the 5% level.
This difference in returns cannot be driven by the level of expected returns since the four factor model captures the firms' different risk exposures. In addition, the annualized difference across the quartiles is 62%. This simple result is consistent with the democracy hypothesis. The market reaction suggests that the legislation will help reduce the compensation of the most highly paid CEOs and benefit their shareholders.
Results relating to option pay and combining option with salary and bonus are presented in panels B and C of Table 3 . Abnormal option compensation does not appear to be related to the market reaction to the Say-on-Pay Bill. This result is not surprising since approval of option compensation already exists.
Since June 30, 2003, the SEC has required shareholder approval for all equity compensation. Similarly, the abnormal total compensation does not appear to be related to the market reaction.
Corporate Governance and market reaction to Say-on-Pay Bill
As we have noted, passage of the bill in the House is certainly no guarantee of its implementation into law. Moreover, firm specific characteristics are likely to influence the value of the bill to each firm and the probability that the firm will take corrective action if the bill is implemented. In the subsequent sections we examine several firm level characteristics that can influence the impact of the bill. First, we look at levels of corporate governance. We note that the relation between the market's reaction to the Say on Pay bill and governance need not be linear or even monotonic. As a firm starts to deviate from good corporate governance, giving shareholders an opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction with executive compensation may help improve governance and compensation design, thus adding firm value. However, if firm governance is so bad as to suggest entrenchment, the managers may choose not to listen to shareholder discontent. Since the shareholder vote proposed in the Say-on-Pay Bill is advisory, the legislation may have little effect on these firms. Ultimately, the relation between governance measures and market reaction to Say on Pay is an empirical issue. Our empirical analysis recognizes the possibility of non-linear effects.
In Table 4 we examine the market reaction to Say-on-Pay Bill and six measures of corporate governance. As in Table 3 , we first sort our sample firms into four portfolios based on these governance variables. Since the governance variables are often discrete, the four portfolios do not always have the same number of firms. 9 Next, we estimate the abnormal portfolio returns during the event window using the four-factor model in equation (1).
Panel A reports the market reaction to the Say-on-Pay Bill and the Governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . We find that firms in the third quartile of the Governance index have the highest market reaction, with daily portfolio abnormal return of 0.154%, or 0.46% over the three-day event window which is statistically significant at about the 5% level. At first, this result may seem surprising. These are firms in the lowest half of 'good governance' as measured by the index, but not the poorest governance. However, as we have noted, firms with the very poorest governance may not be responsive to an advisory vote.
Panel B reports the relation between the market reaction to Say on Pay and the Entrenchment index by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) . The results are similar to that of the Governance index in Panel A. As the Entrenchment index increases from quartile one to quartile three, the abnormal portfolio return increases monotonically, reaching peak at a significant 0.134% for quartile three. However, the abnormal return becomes lower for the firms with highest Entrenchment index.
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2007) find outside directors appointed by the CEO are less effective in monitoring the CEO. Thus, we calculate the percent of outside directors of a firm joining the board after the current CEO starts her tenure. We find a pattern similar to the results for the other governance measures. Panel C shows that firms with more (but not the most)
outside directors appointed by the CEO have the greatest market reaction to Say on Pay.
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that busy boards are less effective in monitoring the managers.
They use a dummy variable to measure whether the majority of outside directors are busy where busy is defined as holding three or more board seats. To have a continuous measure of busy boards, we calculate the percent of a firm's outside directors who hold three or more board seats. Panel D shows that as a board of directors becomes busier (moving from the lowest to the third quartile), the market reaction becomes more positive, with the third quartile having the highest abnormal daily portfolio return of 0.18%, or 0.54% over the three-day event period. This figure is statistically significant at the 5% level.
However, for the firms with the busiest board, the abnormal daily portfolio return is an insignificant 0.08%. Yermack (1996) finds that firms with larger boards have lower market valuation. Thus, our next measure of board governance is the number of directors serving on a board. We again find results similar to the other governance measures. Panel E shows that for firms in the first three quartiles of board size the abnormal returns increase monotonically as the board size increases, with the third quartile having the highest abnormal daily portfolio return of 0.16%, or 0.48% over the three-day event period. This is statistically significant at the 10% level. However, the abnormal daily portfolio return equals an insignificant 0.02% for firms with the largest boards.
Finally, we measure the incentive effects to outside directors by their stock holdings. Panel F again shows that the firms in the third highest stock holding quartile have the most positive market reaction, although it is statistically insignificant.
Overall, these results are consistent with the following interpretation. Firms with weak governance are more likely to benefit from the Say-on-Pay legislation if they are willing to implement better compensation practice. However, firms with the weakest governance are unlikely to benefit since the proposed shareholder vote is advisory and the entrenched managers are likely to ignore shareholder concerns. The results of Table 4 provide support for the democracy hypothesis.
Activist holdings, CEO compensation, and market reaction to Say-on-Pay Bill
Activists are institutions that frequently vote against management. A higher level of activist holdings increases the probability that a vote on executive compensation will receive lower supporting votes. Specifically, we examine the impact of activist holdings by mutual fund families on the market's reaction to Say on Pay. We define an activist mutual fund family as one that votes against the company managers' recommendations in compensation-related proposals more often than does the median mutual fund family. Table 5 presents results across quartiles of activists fund holdings. Activist shareholders are more likely to disapprove excessive executive compensation when they are given the opportunity to vote.
Since previous research has shown that firms are more likely to adopt proposals that receive higher shareholder support, it follows that these firms are more likely to reform executive compensation. We note that firms with higher activist holdings react more positively to the Say-on-Pay Bill. The portfolio of firms with the highest activist holdings earn a cumulative abnormal return of 0.48% during the three day event window, while the corresponding abnormal return of the portfolio of firms with the lowest activist holding is -0.11%. The abnormal return difference between the two portfolios is statistically significant at the 5% level. These results support the democracy hypothesis. We also find that activist mutual funds tend to hold firms with higher levels of option compensation and total compensation but not those with higher levels of CEO salary and bonus.
Multivariate Results
In Table 6 we present multivariate regressions explaining the abnormal return around the passage of the Say-on-Pay Bill. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each firm during the Say-on-Pay event window. Similar to the portfolios in previous tests, we estimate the CAR for each firm as three times β 5 from the four-factor model in equation (1). 10 This coefficient recognizes average (one-day) daily abnormal return over the three days of the event period. Since the abnormal stock returns may be correlated and bias the OLS t-statistics, we also use a bootstrap methodology to estimate p-value of the regression coefficients similar to Zhang (2007) . Specifically, we first randomly select a three-day non-event period from our estimation window. Second, we estimate the abnormal return for each sample firm during this non-event window using the four-factor model in equation (1), with the dummy variable equaling one during this random non-event window and zero otherwise. Third, we estimate the regression specifications in Table 6 using the CAR from this random non-event window. We repeat the three steps above 1,000 times to generate an empirical distribution of the regression coefficients from the non-event days. Finally, we compare the OLS-estimated regression coefficients from the event window to the distribution of coefficients from non-event windows. The bootstrap p-value equals the percent of the 1,000 coefficients that are higher (lower) than the OLS coefficient if the OLS coefficient is positive (negative).
The results from our multivariate regressions must be interpreted with caution considering the low level of explanatory power in the regressions. In all cases the adjusted R 2 is less than 2% and often less than 1%. The possibility remains that some undiscovered variable could dramatically alter these results. Nevertheless, the F-statistic in all regressions is significant. Moreover, we are not aware of other variables related to these results. The low level of explanatory power is not unusual in relating the market reaction of a diverse set of firms to some specific external catalyst. That is, we do not have a sample of firms that engaged in a specific event (e.g. merger, share repurchase, etc). Instead, we have a heterogeneous sample of large firms with varying governance and pay characteristics and examine the stock price reaction to the early stages of a particular legislative proposal that may or may not become law. Viewed in this context, the low level of explanatory power is not as surprising as the significance of specific variables.
Our main variable of interest is abnormal compensation, but we also examine the impact of governance, activist holdings, and institutional holdings in general. In all six regressions of Table 6 we find that the market reaction to the Say on Pay proposal increases significantly with the level of abnormal compensation. The OLS p-values are lower than 5% and the bootstrap p-values are lower than 10% in all six specifications. Using the average coefficients, we calculate that one standard deviation increase in abnormal CEO salary and bonus leads to 0.17% increase in CAR. Consistent with our univariate results, these findings suggest that firms with excessive CEO compensation will benefit the most from mandatory Say on Pay legislation.
Since the univariate tests in Table 4 show that the market reaction to Say-on-Pay Bill is non- 
Responsiveness to shareholder pressure
Next, we examine whether companies that are more responsive to shareholder votes have a different reaction to the Say-on-Pay Bill. Cai, Garner and Walkling (2007a) find that on average, CEOs are more likely to experience declines in abnormal CEO pay the year after their compensation committee members receive lower votes in director elections.
Using data from Table V in Cai, Garner and Walkling (2007a) we identify 90 firms in our current sample as responsive to shareholder votes. In each of these cases the directors serving on compensation committees received more withhold votes in director elections than the median firm and their CEO experienced declines in abnormal compensation the following year. We also identify 40 non-responsive firms. In each of these cases the directors serving on compensation committees receive more withhold votes than the median firm but their CEOs do not experience a decline in abnormal compensation in the following year. The Say on Pay legislation may put more pressure on the responsive firms to reduce abnormal compensation and lead to higher firm value. Results from Table 7 reveals that responsive firms experience significantly higher abnormal daily portfolio returns (0.23%) in comparison to non-responsive firms (-0.14%), and the difference is significant at the 5% level. As a result of their response to shareholder pressure, the responsive firms have lower abnormal compensation than the non-responsive firms. Panel B of Table 7 shows that after controlling for the governance index and activist holdings, the responsive firms still have a higher abnormal return surrounding the House passage of the Say-on-Pay
Bill, and the bootstrap p-values of the coefficient are less than the 10% level in both specifications.
Evidence of previous voting results of compensation proposals
Our findings suggest that future shareholder votes on executive compensation, mandated by the Say-on-Pay Bill, will create value for firms with overpaid CEOs and firms more likely to respond to as the sum of "for" and "against" votes, the sum of "for" "against" and "abstain" votes, or the number of shares outstanding. Table 8 shows that shareholder support is significantly lower when abnormal CEO compensation is higher (in particular if the abnormal option compensation is higher). Shareholder votes are also significantly lower when activist holdings and institutional holdings are higher. These results lend support to our conjecture that if the Say-on-Pay Bill is signed into law, firms with high abnormal CEO compensation are likely to receive lower approval votes from the shareholders. These firms may implement more efficient executive compensation thus increasing firm value.
Conclusion
The post SOX period is associated with several initiatives designed to give shareholders an increased voice in the boardroom. The latest of these initiatives is the Say-on-Pay Bill which passed the House of Representatives on April 20, 2007 by a 2 to 1 margin. This bill does not limit CEO pay but requires a non-binding advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation packages. Proponents argue that the bill will increase shareholder democracy and align owner-manager interests. Opponents argue it will usurp power and directives best left to the management and boards of specific firms.
We analyze the abnormal return of 1,245 firms surrounding the House passage of this bill. Stocks of firms with the highest abnormal CEO pay react in a significant, positive manner to the Say-on-Pay Bill.
Mandatory Say on Pay legislation seems to create value for these firms. These findings are surprising given that several factors bias against us finding significant results. First, while the measure passed the House, it has yet to reach the floor of the Senate. Senator Barack Obama introduced the bill in the Senate Banking Committee on the day it passed the House. Second, even if the bill passes the Senate in its original form the Bush White House has promised to veto it. Third, even if the bill becomes law, it is an advisory vote without binding management to a particular action. The significant findings obtained in spite of these facts suggest our results understate the value impact of the bill.
We find that the reaction is stronger for firms with weak but not the weakest governance. This result suggests that while the advisory shareholder vote proposed by the Say-on-Pay Bill may benefit firms with overpaid CEO, it is up to the firms to make these improvements. The legislation is unlikely to affect the deeply entrenched managers. Finally, abnormal returns are higher in the subset of firms most likely to receive higher votes on such an initiative and in firms more likely to implement changes in response to shareholder votes. The results are consistent with the conjecture that Say-on-Pay Bill will create more value for firms with a larger number of activist shareholders as these shareholders are more likely to exert pressure on the firms during a vote on executive compensation. In addition, the results suggest that higher value can be created for the firms that are more likely to implement changes under the pressure of shareholder votes. Our results provide important evidence to the current initiatives being considered by Congress. They also provide evidence of the importance of activist shareholders and corporate governance in general. The sample consists of 1,245 firms that have data available from ExecuComp, The IRRC Directors and Governance databases, CRSP, and Yahoo Finance. The abnormal CEO compensation variables are the residuals from compensation regressions using all ExecuComp companies with available data during 2004-2006 as the benchmark. Our pay regression includes 5,525 firms over three years, or about 1,842 firms per year. The dependent variables of the three compensation regressions are a CEO's cash compensation (salary and bonus), option compensation, and total compensation (including option grants). The common independent variables for all three regressions are three-year stock returns, the log of the market value of equity, Fama-French 48 industry classification dummies, and calendar year dummies. Additionally, we include ROA in the cash compensation regression, the book-to-market ratio in the option compensation regression, and both variables in the total compensation regression as independent variables. Since compensation variables are highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of the three compensation measures in the regressions. Both the unadjusted and abnormal compensation variables take the average value during the last three-years. The Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index is from IRRC. The Entrenchment index is the sum of six anti-takeover provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) . We define an outside director as being appointed by the CEO if she joins the board after the current CEO, where outside directors are identified by IRRC. We classify a director as busy if she holds three or more board seats. We then calculate for each firm the percent of its outside directors that are appointed by the current CEO or are busy. The outside director stock holding equals the total number of shares owned by all outside directors divided by the number of shares outstanding. Board size equals the number of directors serving on the board. We define a mutual fund family as an activist if it votes against a company manager's recommendation more frequently than the median mutual fund family. Since this study focuses on executive compensation, we define activist funds using only the Compensation-related proposals. The mutual fund voting records during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] The sample consists of 1,245 firms that have data available from ExecuComp, The IRRC Directors and Governance databases, CRSP, and Yahoo Finance. We sort the sample firms into four portfolios based on their average abnormal CEO compensation during the last three years. The details of the compensation regressions are discussed in Table 2 . The average daily abnormal returns (AR) are estimated as the regression coefficient of the event window dummy using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, where the dependent variable equals the average daily stock return of the firms in a portfolio. The independent variables include the market excess return, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, the momentum factor UMD, and the event window dummy that equals one for the three trading days between April 19-23, 2007 , and zero otherwise. The estimation period spans the 222 trading days between April 23, 2006 and April 23, 2007 and excluding the confounding event windows in Table 1 Table 4 Market reaction to Say-on-Pay Bill by legislation by Corporate Governance
The sample consists of 1,245 firms that have data available from ExecuComp, The IRRC Directors and Governance databases, CRSP, and Yahoo Finance. We sort the sample firms into four portfolios based on the following six governance variables. The Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index is from IRRC. The Entrenchment index is the sum of six anti-takeover provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) . We define an outside director as being appointed by the CEO if she joins the board after the current CEO, where outside directors are identified by IRRC. We classify a director as busy if she holds three or more board seats. We then calculate for each firm the percent of its outside directors that are appointed by the current CEO or are busy. The outside director stock holding equals the total number of shares owned by all outside directors divided by the number of shares outstanding. Board size equals the number of directors serving on the board. The average daily abnormal returns (AR) are estimated as the regression coefficient of the event window dummy using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, where the dependent variable equals the average daily stock return of the firms in a portfolio. The independent variables include the market excess return, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, the momentum factor UMD, and the event window dummy that equals one for the three trading days between April The sample consists of 1,245 firms that have data available from ExecuComp, The IRRC Directors and Governance databases, CRSP, and Yahoo Finance. We next sort these 1,245 firms into four portfolios by activist mutual fund holdings. The average daily abnormal returns (AR) are estimated as the regression coefficient of the event window dummy using the Fama-FrenchCarhart four-factor model, where the dependent variable equals the average daily stock return of the firms in a portfolio. The independent variables include the market excess return, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, the momentum factor UMD, and the event window dummy that equals one for the three trading days between April 19-23, 2007 , and zero otherwise. The estimation period spans the 222 trading days between April 23, 2006 and April 23, 2007 and excluding the confounding event windows in Table 1 . We define a mutual fund family as an activist if it votes against the company manager's recommendation more frequently than the median mutual fund family. Since this study focuses on executive compensation, we define activist using only the Compensation-related proposals. The mutual fund voting records during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS). We find in 98% of all proposals voted at shareholder meetings, all funds in the same family cast the same vote. Thus, we aggregate the votes of all funds in a family. We next manually match the mutual fund families in ISS to those in Thomson Financial. Finally, we calculate the percent of a firm's outstanding shares held by activist mutual funds prior to April 19, 2007 . The abnormal CEO compensation variables are the residuals from compensation regressions using all ExecuComp companies during 2004-2006 as the benchmark. Our pay regression includes 5,525 firms over three years, or about 1,842 firms per year. The dependent variable of the compensation regressions is a CEO's cash compensation (salary and bonus), option compensation, or total compensation including option grants. The common independent variables for all three regressions are three-year stock return, log market value of equity, Fama-French 48 industry classification dummies, and calendar year dummies. Additionally, we include ROA in the cash compensation regression, the book-to-market ratio in the option compensation regression, and both variables in the total compensation regression as independent variables. Since compensation variables are highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of the three compensation measures in the regressions. The abnormal compensation variables take the average value during the last three-years. Statistical significance is determined by the t-test for differences in means, and by the Wilcoxon test for differences in medians.
* , The sample consists of 1,245 firms that have data available from ExecuComp, The IRRC Directors and Governance databases, CRSP, and Yahoo Finance. We estimate for each firm the CAR as the average daily AR times three since there are three days in the event window. The average daily AR are estimated as the regression coefficient of the event window dummy using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, where the dependent variable equals the average daily stock return of the firms in a portfolio. The independent variables include the market excess return, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, the momentum factor UMD, and the event window dummy that equals one for the three trading days between April 19-23, 2007 , and zero otherwise. Since the coefficient estimates of the four factor regression can be noisy at the individual firm level, we winsorize the estimated CAR at the 1% and 99% level. The abnormal CEO salary and bonus is the residual from a compensation regression using all ExecuComp companies as the benchmark. The dependent variable of the compensation regression is a CEO's salary and bonus. The independent variables include three-year stock return, ROA log market value of equity, Fama-French 48 industry classification dummies, and calendar year dummies. Since compensation variables are highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of it in the regression. We then take the average value of the abnormal salary and bonus during the last three-years. The Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index is from IRRC. The Entrenchment index is the sum of six antitakeover provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) . We define an outside director as being appointed by the CEO if she joins the board after the current CEO, where outside directors are identified by IRRC. We classify a director as busy if she holds three or more board seats. We then calculate for each firm the percent of its outside directors that are appointed by the current CEO or are busy. The outside director stock holding equals the total number of shares owned by all outside directors divided by the number of shares outstanding. Board size equals the number of directors serving on the board. We define a mutual fund family as an activist if it votes against the company manager's recommendation more frequently than the median mutual fund family. Since this study focuses on executive compensation, we define activist using only the Compensation-related proposals. The mutual fund voting records during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] Using data from Table V in Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2007a), we identify 90 firms in our current sample as responsive to shareholder votes on compensation committee. The directors serving on the compensation committee of these firms received more withhold votes than the median firm and their CEO's abnormal compensation decreased in the following year. We also identify 40 firms as not responsive. The directors serving on the compensation committee of these firms received more withhold votes than the median firm but their CEO's abnormal compensation did not decrease in the following year. In panel A, the average daily abnormal returns (AR) are estimated as the regression coefficients of the event window dummy using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, where the dependent variable equals the average daily stock return of the firms in the responsive or non-responsive portfolio. The independent variables include the market excess return, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, the momentum factor UMD, and the event window dummy that equals one for the three trading days between April 19-23, 2007 , and zero otherwise. The estimation period spans the 222 trading days between April 23, 2006 and April 23, 2007 excluding the confounding event windows in Table 1 . The abnormal CEO compensation variables are the residuals from compensation regressions using all ExecuComp companies as the benchmark. Our pay regression includes 5,525 firms over three years, or about 1,842 firms per year. The dependent variables of the three compensation regressions are a CEO's cash compensation (salary and bonus), option compensation, or total compensation (including option grants). The common independent variables for all three regressions are three-year stock return, the log of market value of equity, Fama-French 48 industry classification dummies, and calendar year dummies. Additionally, we include ROA in the cash compensation regression, the book-to-market ratio in the option compensation regression, and both variables in the total compensation regression as independent variables. Since compensation variables are highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of the three compensation measures in the regressions. The abnormal compensation variables take the average value during the last three-years. In Panel B, we estimate for each firm the CAR as three times the average daily AR since three are three days in the event window. The average daily AR are estimated as the regression coefficient of the event window dummy using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, where the dependent variable equals the average daily stock return of the firms in a portfolio. The independent variables include the market excess return, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, the momentum factor UMD, and the event window dummy that equals one for the three trading days between April 19-23, 2007 , and zero otherwise. Since the coefficient estimates of the four factor regression are noisy at the individual firm level, we winsorize the estimated CAR at the 1% and 99% level. The Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index is from IRRC. We define a mutual fund family as an activist if it votes against the company manager's recommendation more frequently than the median mutual fund family. Since this study focuses on executive compensation, we define activist using only the Compensation-related proposals. The mutual fund voting records during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] The sample includes 1,406 management-sponsored compensation proposals seeking shareholder approval at 1,012 shareholder meetings during [2003] [2004] [2005] . The dependent variable is the percent of votes supporting these proposals, which equals the number of "For" votes divided by the base of votes. ISS identifies the base of votes as the sum of "For" and "Against" votes, the sum of "For", "Against", and "Abstain" votes, or the total shares outstanding. If more than one proposal is voted at a shareholder meeting, we calculate the average supporting votes. The abnormal CEO compensation variables are the residuals from compensation regressions using all ExecuComp companies during 2004-2006 as the benchmark. Our pay regression includes 5,525 firms over three years, or about 1,842 firms per year. The dependent variable of the three compensation regressions is a CEO's cash compensation (salary and bonus), option compensation, or total compensation (including option grants). The common independent variables for all three regressions are three-year stock return, the log of the market value of equity, FamaFrench 48 industry classification dummies, and calendar year dummies. Additionally, we include ROA in the cash compensation regression, the book-to-market ratio in the option compensation regression, and both variables in the total compensation regression as independent variables. Since compensation variables are highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of the three compensation measures in the regressions. The Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index is from IRRC. The Entrenchment index is the sum of six anti-takeover provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) . We define an outside director as being appointed by the CEO if she joins the board after the current CEO, where outside directors are identified by IRRC. We classify a director as busy if she holds three or more board seats. We then calculate for each firm the percent of its outside directors that are appointed by the current CEO or are busy. CEO stock holdings are calculated from ExecuComp. The outside director stock holding equals the total number of shares owned by all outside directors divided by the number of shares outstanding. Board size equals the number of directors serving on the board. We define a mutual fund family as an activist if it votes against the company manager's recommendation more frequently than the median mutual fund family. Since this study focuses on executive compensation, we define activist using only the Compensation-related proposals. The mutual fund voting records during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS). We find in 98% of all proposals voted at shareholder meetings, all funds in the same family cast the same vote. Thus, we aggregate the votes of all funds in a family. We next manually match the mutual fund families in ISS to those in Thomson Financial. Finally, we calculate the percent of a firm's outstanding shares held by activist mutual funds prior to April 19, 2007 . The Fama-French 3-factor regression is estimated during the 36 months prior to the shareholder meeting. EBITDA/Assets equals the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization during the fiscal year before shareholder meeting divided by the total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. tstatistics are in parentheses.
* , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
